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WHAT IS LIVING AND WHAT IS DEAD IN HEGEL, TODAY?
First of all, I should perhaps apologize for purloining the title of a book by Benedetto
Croce and affixing it to the much more modest effort in this final chapter. However, the
addition of the adverb, "today," at the end of the title, serves to differentiate my paper from
Croce's book, at the same time as it gives an indication of the affinity of my enterprise with
Croce's - namely, an updating and critical reassessment of Hegel and Hegelianism.
Croce in his 1907 book on Hegel came to the conclusion that the weak point in Hegel's
system was Hegel's "panlogism," that "exrescence of Hegel's System" through which the
dualism of Nature and Spirit was smothered; or, to say the same thing in a different way, the
unjustified and unjustifiable passage from one distinct and irreducible reality, the "Idea", to
another distinct and irreducible reality, Nature. Croce also defended Hegel, however, and
thought that Hegel's most important contribution was - in contrast to Bergson and others who
would like to renounce thought for intuition -"to have demonstrated that the requirement of a
concrete consciousness was fulfilled in the form of thinking." Croce also indulged himself in the
psychoanalytic insight that the hate of Schopenhauer, Janet and other l9th century adversaries
of Hegel was motivated by the fact that they saw Hegel as the symbol of philosophy itself,
"which is without heart or compassion for feeble-hearted and lazy thinkers, and which does not
allow itself to be seduced by the evils of sentiment or imagination, or to be satiated with
offerings of light appetizers from a half-baked science."
Whatever strong and weak points Hegel may have, apparently his appeal has not

diminished in our present era, and in fact some are speaking of a "Hegel Renaissance". One
phenomenon that would lead one to believe there is such a renaissance in progress, is the
tremendous outpouring of writings on Hegel in the last 5 or 6 years. In collaboration with
Thomas Lutzow I have just completed a review article of almost 40 books on Hegel published
since 1972. 1 One section of this review is devoted to work on Hegel's Phenomenology, and I
might refer to this section of the review as a dramatic example of the volume of work done on
Hegel lately. In this section, we discuss nine English-language books published since 1972,
including 7 commentaries. 2 Since only two books specifically on the Phenomenology were
published in English during the preceding century, 3 one would perhaps be justified in
concluding that something like a renaissance (if not mass delusion) was taking place in Hegel
studies.
What is the cause of this revival of interest in Hegel? Some of the more obvious causes
are well-known: The necessity for understanding Hegel to assess Kierkegaard's reaction against
Hegel, and to assess Marx's and Sartre's use of Hegelian concepts in developing their own
respective positions. For some, the interest in Hegel is concomitant with a reaction against
analytic philosophy.4 For others, the movement to Hegel may be an outgrowth of analytic
philosophy itself. Richard Bernstein broaches this latter possibility in a recent article, 5 in which
he argues that analytical philosophers are finding more and more that single and discrete
analyses "spill over to other issues" (as happens in Hegel's analyses), that progress on
epistemological issues requires confrontation with metaphysical issues (a requirement that
Hegel insisted on), that one can't deal effectively with reference and denotation without getting
into ontology (another Hegelian insight), and so forth.6 Bernstein finds another source for
renewed interest in Hegel in developments within the philosophy of science - e.g. new theories
about the evolution of scientific paradigms, and recent recognition of the influence of social

1

See "Recent Works on Hegel", forthcoming in the American Philosophical Quarterly, Jan., 1979.
Hyppolite, Genesis and structure of the Phenomenology of Spirit of Hegel (Evanston, 111., 1974); Navickas,
Consciousness and Reality: Hegel's Philosophy of Subjectivity (The Hague, 1976); Marx, W., Hegel's
"Phenomenology of Spirit": its Point and Purpose - A Commentary on the Preface and Introduction (N.Y., 1975);
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An example of this reaction is to be found in Richard Norman's Hegel's Phenomenology, which is one volume in the
"Philosophy Now" series, a series which is described by the publisher (St. Martin's Press) as "books...united by nothing
except discontent with the narrowness and specialism of analytic philosophy. Convinced that the analytical movement
has spent its momentum, its latest phase no doubt its last, the [Philosophy Now] series seeks in one way or another to
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contexts on scientific theories. 7 Bernstein even conjectures, with Wilfred Sellars, that the
interest of the logical positivists and logical atomists in Hume, and of the conceptual analysts in
Kant, may soon be followed by a ''Hegelian 'trip' " on the part of avant garde analysts in our
own day .
I would like to add the following putative causes to the ones cited by Bernstein: First of
all, the idea of a perennial philosophy, espoused by thinkers as diverse as Leibniz and Peirce,
and revived by Mortimer Adler and associates, seems itself to be perennial, whether or not
philosophy is perennial. Adler a few decades ago looked to scholastic realism as an anchor of
sanity in a philosophical world gone astray in sectarian rivalry and undisciplined individualism.
But the synthesizing power of the great scholastic edifice has proven not to be unlimited. For
those still seeking a perennial philosophy, but disenchanted with the scholastic model, Hegel
may seem an improvement, if not the final solution. For Hegel saw all philosophical schools and
systems as the unfolding of one central problematic - the relationship of being to thought - and
also manages to synthesize the "Transcendental turn" into this overall schema (something that
scholastic realism was constitutionally unable to accomplish). But alas, the synthesizing power
of the Hegelian system is proving itself to be also finite in an intellectual world grown
accustomed to evolution, relativity, the demise of monarchical political systems, the decline of
the West, and multi-valued logics.
Perhaps a more important rallying point with regard to current attention to Hegel is the
resurgence of interest in the history of philosophy as an essential pursuit of philosophy, as well
as an essentially philosophical pursuit. This renewed interest in history may quite conceivably
have been brought about by the very pluralism and factionalism found in contemporary
philosophy (much in the same fashion that a society in times of confusion or anarchy may
grapple after stability by studying its own historical roots and heritage). Those who would
search in the history of philosophy to find some illumination about the essential goings-on in
contemporary philosophy, will find a kindred spirit in G.W.F. Hegel, who perhaps more than any
other philosopher emphasized philosophy's history and in a very real sense even identified
philosophy with its history.
I mentioned above that in Croce's estimation Hegel was the symbolic personification of
philosophy for many of his anti-philosophical or anti-intellectual enemies. In our own time, the
reason why many are attracted to Hegel may be that they see him as the symbol of philosophy
- or, more specifically, of that old-style philosophy which openly and unabashedly announced
that it was concerned with "knowing all things" in some sort of ultimate way. Nowadays, if
anyone has philosophical inclinations of this sort, he is best advised to keep silent about them.
Because, after all, philosophy, following the example of science, has become extremely
specialized and compartmentalized, and in these days of the neverending "knowledge-
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explosion" who would seriously lay claim to knowing "all things" (i.e., the whole universe, or
even its infinite "areas of discourse")? But for one disgruntled underground species of
philosopher who can't quite give up that grandiose aspiration, the study of Hegel allows him to
do something of this sort, and with a certain amount of respectability, and without having to
put on airs of being a genius. (Oh yes, some will consider this sort of philosopher eccentric and
perhaps not invite them to soirees or to give papers, but they will be tolerated, and perhaps
even be sought after as token reminders of a vanishing species.
But the most serious and important impetus to the study of Hegel, in my opinion, is an
instinctive and/or self-conscious interest in metaphilosophy. "Metaphilosophy" in the
comtemporary world has four distinguishable connotations: It can mean 1) the study of the
nature of philosophy; or 2) the comparison of one philosophical school with another with
regard to various perspectives or points of doctrine; or 3) the enterprise of determining the
structural interrelationship of the various positions and schools in philosophy, so that they can
be comprehended in their totality; or 4) the study of philosophical discourse (and for those for
whom "philosophy" is equivalent to the study of discourse, "metaphilosophy" becomes the
study of [philosophical] discourse about discourse). The study of Hegel seems to be relevant to
metaphilosophy especially in the first and third sense of the term. As regards the first sense,
Hegel was acutely aware of the fact that "buck-passing" must stop with philosophy, that if
philosophy does not become self-consciously aware of its methodology and presuppositions it
can depend on no other higher discipline to inculcate that self-consciousness, and it is precisely
the critical self-consciousness of the philosopher that in Hegel's estimation supplies the
dialectical impetus out of provincial and incomplete positions towards "Absolute Knowledge" the state at which philosophy becomes fully self-conscious. As regards the third sense of
"metaphilosophy", one of Hegel's most persistent endeavors was to develop a comprehensive
"System" of philosophy in which all the various schools of thought - empiricism and idealism,
materialism and rationalism, as well as Platonism, Cartesianism, Kantianism, etc. - could be
seen in their proper perspective and interrelationships. Needless to say, Hegel was an
incorrigible optimist about the possibility of finding a place for even the strangest bedfellows;
and in our day, as we make our way through the intellectual wilds of ethical noncognitivism,
process philosophy and its finite God, existential Marxists, Marxist theologians, and secondand third- order linguistic analysts - we could no doubt use a good dose of Hegel's optimism
about the possibility of synthesis.
So much for the possible subjective instigations or motivations for the renewal of
interest in Hegel. I would like in the remainder of this paper to discuss some of the objective
results of the intensified study of Hegel, and then to close with a critical assessment of Hegel's
deficiencies and errors.
One salutary result of the study of Hegel had been its inducement to a holistic view.
One cannot read Hegel seriously and sympathetically without beginning to view the

specialization and prima facie autonomy of various branches of philosophy as a situation lacking
necessity (ontological or otherwise) and even counter-productive. To Hegel's mind,
metaphysics must be studied in conjunction with epistemology and logic; ethics in conjunction
with politics, philosophical anthropology, law; and so forth. We do not necessarily have to
agree with Hegel that the holistic approach is the "only" viable one; but we would no doubt
benefit from complementing the process of specialization with a process of integration, analysis
with synthesis. 8
One result of the study of Hegel's political philosophy has been a critical reassessment
of democratic ideology. 9 Hegel was in harmony with liberal democratic theory in his emphasis
on citizen participation in government; but he was sharply at odds with the democratic
theorists regarding the mode of participation in government. Hegel had no patience with the
idea that "one man, one vote" was a formula guaranteeing political self-determination. He
insisted on the fact that the "input" of the citizenry should be mediated by natural groupings,
e.g. labor unions as well as industrial interests, and that government should be highly
structured to assure that representation from all the various natural or organic groupings in the
state will find a place in the national assemblies. At a time when the election of Hitler on the
basis of the "one man, one vote" principle is still a fairly recent memory, and when the control
of the average American working man over the federal government is often reducible to
perilous choices, every few years, between congressional or presidential candidates neither of
whom is thought satisfactory -- it would be appropriate for us to ask, like Hegel, is there any
ingenuous, natural way to insure constant participation and representation of citizens in a free
state?
In metaphysics and ethics one very important consequence of Hegel's dialectical
approach is an emphasis on paradox. To most Western philosophers, paradox is something
found exclusively in poetry, Eastern philosophy and the Christian gospels; and a paradox in
philosophy is something to be avoided, perhaps studied, but certainly not to be intentionally
cultivated. Hegel's philosophy, in contrast, is replete with paradoxes, deliberately produced and
not infrequently proffered as a kind of solution rather than as a "problem" or puzzle. For
example, we find that the Master is the Slave, and vice versa; that sense certainty is the most
"abstract" form of knowledge; that the moralist must unconsciously perpetuate immorality to
safeguard his principles; that established communal possession of property (communism)
would destroy both property and personality; that being and nothingness as ultimate
abstractions converge in meaning; that freedom is at its highest level when it is extrinsically
established and necessitated; and that our consciousness of God is identical with God's
consciousness of himself. The existence of paradoxes, of course, puts to the test our linguistic
8

I have made an attempt in that direction in a forthcoming book Ethica Dialectica: a Study of Ethical Oppositions
(Nijhoff, 1978), which includes chapters on morality and legality, ethics and politics, ethics and aesthetics, etc.
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E.g. in Judith Shklar's book, mentioned above, n. 2.

and logical conventions regarding univocity and non-contradiction, but to dismiss them simply
on such grounds would be analogous to Einstein dismissing phenomenon such as apparent
change of mass at high speeds, because they flouted Newtonian physical laws. In other words,
it may just so happen that there are some philosophical truths that can only be stated
paradoxically, and not after the manner of a scientific proposition.
I would like to suggest that one final consequence of the Hegel "renaissance" would
have to be a revival of Christian philosophy. I realize that leftist and atheist Hegelians still
abound, but anyone who studies the life and intellectual evolution of Hegel must realize that
his abandonment of the ministry after receiving his theology degree was not a signal that he
was abandoning faith and commitment to Lutheran Christianity. It is true that, because of his
confidence in the power of Reason, Hegel seems to some to make short shrift of faith, and even
to tend towards a sort of Gnosticism. But one must understand that Hegel took Anselm's
dictum "fides quaerens intellectum" (faith seeking understanding) even more seriously than
Anselm himself. For example, in the Introduction to his Philosophy of History, Hegel poses the
rhetorical question, why is it that Christians seem so loathe to obey the great commandment
"to love and know the Lord"? 10 Why are they so diffident about being able to know the Lord,
when they are commanded to do so by God himself? In particular (with regard to the
philosophy of history) why do they take refuge in "faith" in Divine Providence, as if it were
impossible to come to a scientific understanding of the way that Divine Providence unfolds in
and through history? And thus, although Hegel is taken as the progenitor of the secularization
hypothesis and even the "death of God" movement, Hegel is more properly the apologist for
the presence of God in the world (for example, his Philosophy of History is expressly a
justification of the way that Divine Providence is leading mankind to freedom). But the fact that
Hegel's God is a worldly God has scandalized some Christian philosophers, and of course it is
only those others who can believe in a God of this sort who will find in Hegel a source of
Christian philosophy.
Let me now balance this perusal of the positive aspects of Hegelianism with an appraisal
of some of the more salient deficiencies and errors of Hegel.
Many critics of Hegel, including Marx and Kierkegaard, have pointed out that Hegel's
"System" was a magnificent failure while admitting that his dialectical "method" was a great
achievement. Others exonerate the System from guilt, and point to the dialectic itself as Hegel's
drawback. 11 I side with the former critics. Hegel's System is obviously patterned after Fichte's
and Schelling's attempts at system-building, and is thus "dated" and only of historical interest
to those outside Hegel's cultural context. However, I would add the observation that those who
oppose systems -- whether political or philosophical -- must do so systematically to be effective.
10

Sibree tr., p. 14
Cf. for example, Werner Becker, Hegel's Phanomenologie des Geistes: eine Interpretation (Stuttgart, 1971), p. 140.
Becker, a realist, claims that dialectic in the last analysis is an anti-progressive (conservative) methodology.
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There seems to be something instinctive about human system-building. Kierkegaard could
never have been an effective antagonist of Hegel without his own counter-system.
Hegel, influenced by his own cultural milieu, was also subject to some very deep-seated
prejudices, and we should be aware of these in studying him. For one thing, in line with the proHellenist sentiment of the times he grew up in, he lionized the Greeks, but saw fit to
characterize the Roman Republic and the Roman Empire as essentially a band of robbers who
got together and required some strong practical laws and tyrannical control to keep them from
turning on each other 12 (as if they were some ancient version of the Mafia). And although one
could interpret parts of Hegel's chapter on "Faith and Insight" in the Phenomenology as a
defense of Catholic veneration of relics, crucifixes and the host, nevertheless when Hegel
speaks explicitly in his Philosophy of History and Philosophy of Religion about Catholicism, he
almost always refers to it with extreme Lutheran bias as an example of superstition and
brainwashing, and as the main obstacle to man's attainment of freedom in the modern world.
The provinciality of Hegel likewise seems remarkable, if we consider the fact that he was
the great exponent of Absolute Spirit in its universality. In his Philosophy of History, Hegel not
only "writes off" China as being outside history, but refuses to even devote any attention to
Russia and the Slavic countries because they had not contributed anything important to past
(European) history. And even Hegel's empathy with fellow European nations was severely
limited, as is witnessed by his disagreement with Kant about the possibility of anything like a
League of Nations.13 Hegel, like Kant, 14 seemed to think of the Negroes as a definitely inferior
race, exhibiting "the natural man in his completely wild and untamed state." 15 In line with
these sentiments he of course eliminates the whole continent of Africa from explicit historical
consideration, except in so far as they were influenced by European Mediterranean culture. He
offers a left-handed compliment to "the Negroes", however, insofar as he ascribes natural
talent to them, whereas the American Indians, he opines, have no such natural endowments! 16
Hegel's praise of war and overall militarianism are well-known. But actually, such
sentiments are surprising if we take into account the fact that there is at least an implicit
realization of what is in modern parlance called "sublimation" in Hegel's philosophy. If, for
example, the "Life and Death Struggle"17 is sublated (aufgehoben) or "sublimated" into a
Master-Slave relationship, and if the latter in its turn is sublated or sublimated into Stoicism,
etc. - why cannot the propensity to war itself be sublated or sublimated into some higher form?
Much has already been said in criticism of Hegel's defense of monarchy. So I will not
dwell on this subject except to point out that his defense of monarchy itself seems to be
12

See Philosophy of History, p. 283ff., p. 431.
See Philosophy of Right, 333, Remark.
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See e.g. Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime. Goldthwart tr. (Berkeley, 1960, p. 110.
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Philosophy of History, p. 93.
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Philosophy of History, p. 82.
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Phenomenology, Miller tr., 187
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indicative of a deeper philosophical deficiency in Hegel - an overemphasis on idealistic
formalism (i.e. the sort for which Hegel criticized Fichte). For Hegel's defense of the monarch in
the Philosophy of Right is dictated by the necessity of finding an adequate synthesis of nature
and spirit. From the point of view of the exigencies of this synthesis, the monarch was almost a
god-sent gift to philosophy. For the monarch was a leader by birth, i.e. nature, and also the
epitome of freedom, individuality and uniqueness - i.e. the qualities of spirit. But Hegel's joy in
finding such a perfect synthesis seems to have been dampened by the realization that this idea
conflicted with empirical reality.18 Nevertheless, the Hegel who criticized Fichte so severely in
his History of Philosophy for failing to take cognizance of empirical reality seems to fall into the
same idealistic "trap".
I would like to conclude this article by posing the question Benedetto Croce posed at the
end of the aforementioned book: Should we be Hegelians today? And, like Croce, I would like to
answer, "yes and no". No, because the sort of deficiencies I have just mentioned are a
formidable obstacle to presenting Hegel's philosophy as the philosophy for our times; and I'm
sure that Hegel himself, who strongly insisted on historical and cultural limitations of any
philosophy, would not be a "Hegelian" now, if by "Hegelian" is meant someone who champions
monarchy, systems built out of triads, 19 outdated scientific ideas, etc. but yes, we should be
"Hegelians" if by "Hegelian" is meant for example, someone who gives explicit attention to the
dialectical oppositions in the contemporary spirit and tries to bridge these oppositions on a
philosophical level, or someone who sees the subiect-object relationship as a fundamental
18

See Philosophy of Right, 171, Zusatze, in which Hegel admits that the effective power of the monarch is to be
limited to "dotting the i's and crossing the t's". Some have suggested that passages such as this, along with other
passages that extoll trial by jury and advance forms of legislative representation (neither of which were featured in
Prussia at the time Hegel wrote the Philosophy of Right), have to be taken as examples of supreme and intentional
irony. In other words, Hegel in writing such things was actually rebelling against the status quo - as much as a writer
could rebel in those times without being censored or ejected as a revolutionary.
As added confirmation of this thesis they draw attention to the fact that Hegel seems to reverse the usual
order of the Encyclopedia and proceed from the concrete (the monarch) to the abstract (legislative and executive)
rather than the reverse (which would seem more "normal").
However, this thesis must deal with the following objections: 1) there is an obvious parallel between the
procedure here and that found in the section on the Family, in which Hegel proceeds from the individual to the family,
and civil society, i.e. to the larger context; 2) if Hegel did not prefer a limited monarchy, what did he prefer? and how
do we explain his fairly frequent criticisms of democracy and republican forms of government? and 3) it would be
more proper to say that the Philosophy of Right is about the Idea of the State, rather than the State itself and it is
possible and even probable that certain progressive aspects of the free State (e.g. trial by jury) might be quite clearly
implicated in the Idea of the State, although they have not yet been instantiated in empirical reality (Hegel maintained
not only that "the Real is the Rational" but also that "the Rational is the Real").
19
I am not referring here to the use of dialectic, but to the explicit presentation of systems triadically. This latter
propensity seems to be something peculiar to early l9th century idealism, which was elated to have "rediscovered"
"triplicity". This propensity is analogous to the enthusiasm of certain mediaeval scholastics who "rediscovered"
Aristotelian syllogistic laws and tried to organize treatises explicitly in syllogistic form. However, the traditional
philosopher can never dispense with syllogisms, and the dialectical philosopher cannot dispense with the process of
opposition and synthesis. It should be noted that the Phenomenology as a kind of "voyage of discovery" is less overtly
structured triadically - and, strange as it may seem, this may be one reason why the Phenomenology seems less
"foreign" to 20th century philosophers than the System proper.

philosophical problematic worthy of serious attention and hard work, or someone who is
concerned with assuring meaningful and effective participation of citizens in their government.
And I might add that I'm sure that one of the best ways of becoming a "Hegelian" in the latter
sense is to study Hegel.

